It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion by the
numerous avenues leading to it, or more defenseless by the thinness of
the neighboring population, or offers a greater temptation to invasion,
either as a permanent acquisition or as a prize to the cupidity of
grasping invaders from the immense amount of produce deposited there,
than the city of New Orleans. It is known also that the seizure of no
part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate
interests of so many States and of so many of our fellow-citizens,
comprising all that extensive territory and numerous population which
are connected with and dependent on the Mississippi, as the seizure of
that city. Strong works, well posted, were therefore deemed absolutely
necessary for its protection.
It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which
communicate directly with or approach nearest to New Orleans, that the
town is assailable. It will be recollected that in the late war the
public solicitude was excited not so much by the danger which menaced it
in those directions as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be
made there, the main force, landing either in the bay of Mobile or other
waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town
in the rear of the army which had been collected there for its defense.
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