In his message he said that arrests,
and suspension of the writ, had been made "very sparingly;" and that, if
authority had been stretched, at least the question was pertinent: "Are
all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go
to pieces, lest that one be violated?" He, however, believed that in
fact this question was not presented, and that the law had not been
violated. "The provision of the Constitution, that the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it, is equivalent
to a provision that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it." As between
Congress and the executive, "the Constitution itself is silent as to
which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly
made for a dangerous emergency it cannot be believed that the framers of
the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its
course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of
which might be prevented, as was intended in this case by the
rebellion."
If it was difficult, it was also undesirable to confute the President's
logic. The necessity for military arrests and for indefinite detention
of the arrested persons was undeniable. Congress therefore recognized
the legality of what had been done, and the power was frequently
exercised thereafter, and to great advantage.
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