As to the rank and file, they
can know nothing more of the matter than the arms they carry. They hardly
know what troops are upon their own right or left the length of a regiment
away. If it is a cloudy day they are ignorant even of the points of the
compass. It may be said, generally, that a soldier's knowledge of what is
going on about him is coterminous with his official relation to it and his
personal connection with it; what is going on in front of him he does not
know at all until he learns it afterward.
At nine o'clock on the morning of the 27th Wood's division was withdrawn
and replaced by Stanley's. Supported by Johnson's division, it moved at
ten o'clock to the left, in the rear of Schofield, a distance of four
miles through a forest, and at two o'clock in the afternoon had reached a
position where General Howard believed himself free to move in behind the
enemy's forces and attack them in the rear, or at least, striking them in
the flank, crush his way along their line in the direction of its length,
throw them into confusion and prepare an easy victory for a supporting
attack in front. In selecting General Howard for this bold adventure
General Sherman was doubtless not unmindful of Chancellorsville, where
Stonewall Jackson had executed a similar manoeuvre for Howard's
instruction. Experience is a normal school: it teaches how to teach.
There are some differences to be noted. At Chancellorsville it was Jackson
who attacked; at Pickett's Mill, Howard.
Pages:
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199