There can be no doubt that Russell,
in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear two
points: first, the close harmony with France--which in fact was not so
close as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the Foreign
Secretary in guarding British interests. Now in fact British trade was
destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been
greatly hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade
feasible. Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the
"Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_
blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:
"If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern
Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by
agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles,
creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run
for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be
transhipped. But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such
plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]."
A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to
Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the
remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of
cotton in any considerable amount.
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