If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory as I
think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success and
power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would have
resulted[632]." The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell was
conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediately
following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions to
Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of the
declaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel replied
with some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strong
representation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton and
tobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had little
expectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute the
orders," advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customary
arguments on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual
refusal to alter British policy[634]. If Seward was sincere in asking
for a retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook
European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories to
return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable in
causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well chosen.
Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward's
renewal of demand on belligerency.
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