Mann," who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London to
enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go to
London, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he could
guess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sent
to him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything on
Mexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to
France. In C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is
stated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of
Mercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result
of Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's
instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, while
it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it will
no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informed
Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as in
Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons at
their face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothing
in French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour,
while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it.]
[Footnote 710: Mason Papers.]
[Footnote 711: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19.
Pages:
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529