"
Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyons
protested vigorously and implied that war must result.
"Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience
not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: that he
should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity
altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came
from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure
would be unavoidable[984]."
Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must not
be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling on
the notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutral
Mexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruise
in destruction of French commerce, adding that "one might almost
suppose" some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for the
purpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985].
Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9,
that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present to
Russell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance that
no further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports.
This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language but
in no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering
bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national navigating
interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by .
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