5, from the point of view
of his own anxiety at the time, was naturally inclined to magnify the
effects of his own efforts and to regard the _crisis_ as occurring in
September. His notes to Russell and his diary records were early the
main basis of historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved
the accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass.
Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, p. 293, _seq._) ignores Rhodes,
harks back to the old argument and amplifies it with much new and
interesting citation, but not to conviction. My interpretation is that
the real crisis of Governmental decision to act came in April, and that
events in September were but final applications of that decision.]
[Footnote 1031: Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. 26, 1863. Copy in
Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.]
[Footnote 1032: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, 1863.]
[Footnote 1033: Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You will learn by the
papers that we have at last seized the Iron Clads. Whether we shall be
able to bring home to them legally that they were Confederate property
is another matter. I think we can, but at all events no moral doubt can
be entertained of the fact, and, therefore, we are under no anxiety
whether as to the public or Parliamentary view of our proceeding.
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